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Abstract. Data mining has been widely applied to the problem of In-
trusion Detection in computer networks. However, the misconception of
the underlying problem has led to out of context results. This paper
shows that factors such as the probability of intrusion and the costs of
responding to detected intrusions must be taken into account in order
to compare the effectiveness of machine learning algorithms over the in-
trusion detection domain. Furthermore, we show the advantages of com-
bining different detection techniques. Results regarding the well known
1999 KDD dataset are shown.
1 Introduction
According to ISO/IEC TR 15947 [8] intrusion detection is the process of identi-
fying that an intrusion has been attempted, is occurring or has occurred. Thus,
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are technical systems that are used to identify
and respond to intrusions in IT systems. Consequently, IDS attempt to identify
actions that does not conform to security policy.
IDS analysis of the data sources can be done through different methods such
as expert systems, statistical techniques, signature analysis, neural networks,
artificial immune systems or data mining among others. Data mining is defined
as the process of discovering patterns in data automatically. This technique deals
well with big amounts of information what makes it appropriate for the intrusion
detection task. In fact, the appliance of data mining to the intrusion detection
field is an active research topic [15, 23, 6]. After the process of extracting the
interesting characteristics from data sources, either supervised or unsupervised
learning can be applied over the processed data. Supervised algorithms need a
training set in order to build the model that will be used in operating conditions.
At the training phase, the IDS can model either the normal behaviour of the
system, the abnormal or both. The main advantages of IDS based on supervised
learning are their ability to detect known attacks and minor variants of them.
Weak points deal with the necessity of building proper training datasets and
with the time consuming phase for building the models. On the other hand,
unsupervised learning does not require a training dataset.
Evaluation of IDS effectiveness did not become an active topic until 1998.
MIT Lincoln Laboratories (MIT/LL) led an ambitious evaluation of IDS [12,
13]. A military network was simulated in order to test different proposals. These
works and subsequent criticism [16, 14] set down the main difficulties that re-
search community had to face in order to evaluate IDS effectiveness [17]. A
processed version of the data generated by MIT/LL was used to evaluate several
machine learning algorithms in the 1999 KDD intrusion detection contest [4].
This dataset has been used extensively after the contest although its limitations
(derives from a controversial dataset and the probability of intrusion that it
shows is far away from what is expectable in a real scenario).
In order to measure IDS effectiveness the receiver operating characteristic
(ROC) has been widely used. ROC was introduced in signal theory to charac-
terize the trade-off between hit rate and false alarm rate over a noisy channel.
In data mining field, it has been used to measure machine learning algorithms
performance when the class distribution is not balanced (i.e. accuracy is not a
good measure). The main problem of ROC analysis is that it does not consider
the costs of misclassification (wrong detections). Normally the cost of a false
negative (failing to detect an intrusion) is much higher than the cost of a false
positive (stating an event is hostile when it is not) so a different representation
of effectiveness that takes this situation into account is necessary. In fact, if the
ROC curves of two classifiers (detectors) cross, it could not be stated that one
outperforms the other under any circumstances. Because of this, Drummond [3]
proposed an alternative representation to the ROC in order to compare classifiers
under different class distributions and error costs.
Ulvila works [5, 24, 25] showed that IDS effectiveness depends not only on
the hit rate and false alarm rate but also on the hostility of the operating en-
vironment and on the cost of detection errors. Orfila [19] showed the need of
including the response cost in order to evaluate IDS effectiveness properly.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we expose
a methodology for comparing IDS effectiveness from a decision analysis per-
spective. Then in section 3 we propose a simple way to combine the detection
capabilities of several machine learning techniques. Section 4 overviews 1999
KDD dataset that is used in section 5 for the experimental work. This experi-
mental work compares different machine learning algorithms with the combined
model proposed in section 3 by means of the methodology described in section
2. Finally, this paper ends up with the main conclusions.
2 Decision Model Analysis
Decision theory has been successfully applied in areas such as Psychology [22],
Economy [21] or Meteorology [9]. In the computer security field, it has been
used to face the intrusion detection task, in order to provide a way to compare
different IDS and to determine the best operating point of an IDS under different
operating conditions [5].
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Fig. 1. Decision tree of the detector’s expected cost that considers the response cost
In this section we propose a method to measure IDS effectiveness that con-
siders both damage (produced by a successful intrusion) and response cost (the
one incurred by taking actions in order to avoid an intrusion [19]). The compari-
son is made from an utility perspective, that means the best IDS is the one that
better helps on minimizing expenses when defending a system.
The system we want to protect can be in two possible states: an intrusive state
(I) or a non intrusive state (NI). Similarly an IDS, depending on the analysis
of data sources, can report an alarm (A) or not (NA). The ROC of a detector
is a plot of the conditional probabilities P (A|I) (hit rate H) vs. P (A|NI) (false
alarm rate F) as shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Conditional probabilities that an IDS detects the system state
System state
Detector’s report No intrusion (NI) Intrusion (I)
No alarm (NA) FVN (1− F ) FFN (1−H)
Alarm (A) FFP (F ) FVP (H)
The expected cost of a detector on a certain operating point can be computed
analyzing the decision tree of Figure 1.
Decision or action nodes, which are displayed as squares, are under control
of the decision maker, who will choose which branch to follow. Conversely, the
circles represent event nodes that are subject to uncertainty. A probability dis-
tribution represents the uncertainty about which branch will happen following
an event node. Event nodes probabilities are defined as follows:
– p1: is the probability that the detector reports no alarm.
– p2: is the conditional probability of no intrusion given that the detector
reports no alarm.
– p3: is the conditional probability of no intrusion given that the detector
reports an alarm.
Conditional probabilities 1− p2 and 1− p3 can be expressed in terms of hit
and false alarm rates:
1− p2 = P (I|NA) = P (NA|I)P (I)
P (NA)
=
(1−H)p
p1
(1)
1− p3 = P (I|A) = P (A|I)P (I)
P (A)
=
Hp
1− p1 (2)
In the model we propose, there is a cost C if the IDS responds, irrespective
the intrusion took place or not, that corresponds to the countermeasures taken.
L represents the losses if there is a false negative. The decision maker (the own
IDS if the response is automatic or the network administrator if it is not) will
follow the strategy that minimizes the expected cost. In order to compute this
expected cost it is necessary to calculate the expected cost conditional on the
detector’s report. The four possibilities are summarized in Table 2. The prior
probability that an intrusion happens is represented by p (P(I)).
Table 2. Expected cost of responses vs. detector’s report
Response
Detector’s report No Yes
No alarm L(1− p2) = L(1−H)pp1 Cp2 + C(1− p2) = C
Alarm L(1− p3) = LHp1−p1 Cp3 + C(1− p3) = C
Thus, if the report of the detector is known, the minimal expected cost can
be computed. If there is no alarm the expression for the expected cost under this
condition is:
MNA = min{L(1− p2), C} = min{L(1−H)p
p1
, C} (3)
Similarly, the expected cost given an alarm is:
MA = min{L(1− p3), C} = min{ LHp1− p1 , C} (4)
Finally, the expected cost of operating at a given operating point (a point in
the ROC curve), is the sum of the products of the probabilities of the detector’s
reports and the expected costs of operating conditional on the reports. Then the
expression is:
p1min{L(1−H)pp1 , C}+ (1− p1)min{
LHp
1−p1 , C} =
= min{L(1−H)p, C((1− F )(1− p) + (1−H)p)} +
+ min{LHp,C(F (1− p) +Hp)} (5)
Consequently, the expected cost by unit loss (M) is:
M = min{(1−H)p, C
L
((1− F )(1− p) + (1−H)p)}+
+ min{Hp, C
L
(F (1− p) +Hp)} (6)
It is important to note that this formulation includes the possibility of taking
actions against the report of the detector if this action leads to a lower expected
cost.
Next, a metric that measures the value of an IDS is introduced. First some
concepts need to be defined.
The expected expense of a perfect IDS (the one that achieves H=1 and F=0)
by unit loss is (from expression (6))
Mper = min{p, C
L
p} = pmin{1, C
L
} (7)
In addition, an expression is needed for the expected cost when only infor-
mation about the probability of intrusion is available (no IDS working). In this
situation, the decision maker can adopt two strategies: always protect taking
some precautionary action (incurring in a cost C) or never protect (incurring in
losses pL). Consequently, the decision maker will respond if C < pL and will not
if C > pL. Then, the expected cost by unit loss is:
Mprob = min{p, C
L
} (8)
Accordingly, the value of an IDS is defined as the reduction it gives on the
expected cost over the one corresponding to the only knowledge of the probability
of intrusion, normalized by the maximum possible reduction.
V =
Mprob −M
Mprob −Mper (9)
As a result, if an IDS is perfect at detecting intrusions its value is 1. Con-
versely, an IDS that does not improve a predictive system solely based on the
probability of intrusion has a value less or equal than 0.
The metric of value is very useful because it includes all the relevant pa-
rameters involved in the evaluation of IDS effectiveness. A similar metric was
proposed in [18] but it did not manage the possibility that a decision is made
contrary to the detector’s report.
3 Parametric IDS
Several IDS can not be tuned to work at different operating points. This is a
limiting feature. An operating point is defined by a pair (F,H). In order to adapt
to different operating conditions, an IDS should be able to work at different
operating points [2]. In consequence, we propose a very simple parametric IDS
that consists on combining different non parametric detection techniques.
The question we want to answer is in what sense the mere combination of
machine learning algorithms outperforms the individual approaches on intrusion
detection domain. The way the parametric IDS works is the following. Let us
consider an event happens on the monitored system. If the fraction of individual
models that state the event is hostile is over a certain probability threshold pt,
then the parametric IDS will assume it as intrusive. pt can be tuned from 0 to 1
in such a way that different predictions about the event are produced. In other
words, the parametric detection depends on how many machine learning models
predicted the event as hostile and on the threshold pt.
Therefore, the hit rate and false alarm rate of the parametric IDS, computed
over an event dataset, depend on this threshold pt [18].
H = H(pt) F = F (pt) ∀pt ∈ [0, 1] (10)
Consequently, the value of the IDS, as defined in equation (9), also depends
on pt.
V = V (pt) ∀pt ∈ [0, 1] (11)
For a fixed CL relationship, the optimum value of the IDS is:
Vopt = max
pt
V (pt) ∀pt ∈ [0, 1]. (12)
4 Experimental Setup
The main problem to test IDS effectiveness is the absence of non controversial
benchmarks. It is not an easy task to build such a benchmark because different
requirements must be considered to test different IDS [17]. There are also prob-
lems in repeating experiments with real data (privacy problems) and simulated
data is under suspicion because is hard to establish how close the artificial data is
Table 3. Attack and normal instances in original KDD training and test datasets
Training Test
Normal instances 97277 60593
Attack instances 396743 250436
Total 494020 311029
% of normal instances 19.69 19.48
% of attack instances 80.31 80.52
Table 4. Attack and normal instances in original training and test 1999 KDD datasets
(after filtering)
Training Test
Normal instances 97277 60593
Attack instances 4887 2650
Total 102164 63243
% of normal instances 95.22 95.81
% of attack instances 4.78 4.19
to the real one. The ad-hoc methodology that is prevalent in today’s testing and
evaluation of network intrusion detection systems makes it difficult to compare
different algorithms and approaches [1]. Although the best way to evaluate any
intrusion detection algorithm is to use live or recorded real traffic from the site
where the algorithm is going to be deployed, there is a need of public datasets
in order to evaluate proposals in a repeatable manner.
In order to model the sensor agents of our system , we needed a datFor the
experiments we have used the well known 1999 KDD dataset1 [4]. It derives
from from MIT/LL 98 evaluation. Training and testing datasets were created
at Columbia University. KDD dataset is the most frequently used dataset to
test machine learning algorithms on the intrusion detection domain (e.g. [7, 20,
10]). It was firstly employed for a machine learning competition in order to test
different classifiers over the intrusion detection domain. A complete description
of the data mining process can be found in [11]. They are currently available at
California University website2. Next, we are going to review the dataset briefly
(a general description can be found in [4]). Each connection record defines a
TCP session and is described by 41 attributes (38 numeric and 3 nominal), and
the corresponding class that indicates if the record represents normal or hostile
activity. The number of normal and attack examples are summarized in Table 3.
As it can be seen, the percentage of attacks is extraordinary high both on training
and test datasets. This situation is not expectable in a real environment because,
normally, the probability of intrusion is very low. However we have shown in
previous sections the importance of the probability of intrusion when evaluating
IDS effectiveness. Consequently the experiments we carried out have been done
over original and filtered data. The filtering consisted on getting rid of the most
1 In fact the reduced version of the dataset (10% of the complete one)
2 http://kdd.ics.uci.edu/databases/kddcup99/kddcup99.html
common attack types both in training and test datasets. The resulting number
of examples is summarized in Table 4. It is important to note that, after filtering,
attack frequency remains under 5%.
We have experimented with 10 machine learning algorithms over the complete
and the filtered datasets. Two of these algorithms are based on decision trees
(ADTree, J48 ), five in rules (ConjuctiveRule, DecisionStump, DecisionTable,
OneR, PART ), one on bayesian learning (Na¨ıveBayes) and two in simpler tech-
niques (HyperPipes, VFI )3. Consequently, 10 models were built from training
dataset and tested against the test dataset. The parametric IDS built from the
individual models is tested against test dataset as well. The following section
shows the results.
5 Experimental Results
Figure 2 shows the operating points of each machine learning model against the
ROC points of the parametric IDS over the original dataset. The main conclu-
sions from the analysis of this figure are:
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Fig. 2. ROC space of parametric IDS vs. individual models over original KDD test
dataset
3 The names correspond to the implementation name in WEKA software [26]
– Parametric IDS can work on different operating points.
– As pt is increased, ROC points of the parametric IDS present lower H and
F.
– It is difficult to state if the parametric model outperforms the non parametric
components.
Then, in order to compare the different models, the metric of value we pro-
posed in section 2 is used. Figure 3a) shows non parametric value curves while
Figure 3b) shows those that correspond to the parametric IDS.
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Fig. 3. Value curves over original KDD test dataset. a) Machine learning models and
b) Parametric IDS
The main conclusions from these results are:
– PART is the machine learning model that achieves better results over a wider
C
L range. In addition, the greatest value of the non parametric IDS is also ob-
tained by PART. The corresponding operating point is (F,H)=(0.009,0.916)
with V=0.907 for CL=0.805. This means that under these cost conditions and
with the unrealistic probability of intrusion of the test dataset, PART is ex-
pected to have a value that is 90.7% of the perfect IDS.
– Parametric IDS obtains results that are similar to PART for high CL relation-
ships. But for lower CL the parametric system is much better. For instance,
if CL=0.3 the value of the parametric IDS is 0.441 (pt=0.2). Under the same
operating conditions, the best non parametric model (PART ) has a value of
0.185. This means an increase of 25.6%. In addition, the CL range where the
parametric is valuable is 25% wider than any of the individual models.
As we have stated, the probability of intrusion that KDD dataset shows is not
realistic. Next results show the effectiveness of the systems tested after filtering
the data as explained in section 4. Figure 4 shows the corresponding points on
ROC space and Figure 5 exposes the value curves. From the ROC curves is
difficult to say if J48 is more effective than Na¨ıveBayes or contrary. Figure 5a)
shows that for CL >0.41 J48 is preferred but for lower values Na¨ıveBayes is
better. It is important to note that normally L is much bigger than C because
the losses when an intrusion happens are usually bigger than the cost of taking
some action of response. Therefore, it is important to study the behaviour for
low CL relationships.
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dataset
On the other hand, parametric IDS clearly outperforms any of the machine
learning models. The envelope of the first includes the envelope of the composi-
tion of the second ones. To put it simply, there is no cost relationship where an
individual algorithm outperforms the parametric IDS. In fact, the maximum of
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Fig. 5. Value curves computed over KDD filtered test dataset
the parametric envelope is a 9.3% over the best non parametric curve. Further-
more, the range with value is also bigger for the parametric approach and, what
is more important, for low CL relationships (0.00012 <
C
L < 0.018) the combined
model is valuable and none of its components separately has any value.
6 Conclusions
This paper has proposed a method for comparing IDS effectiveness from a per-
spective of the utility of IDS detections. Experimental work has been done fo-
cusing on supervised machine learning algorithms. Results show that, generally,
the best classifier highly depends on the operating conditions (summarized in
the cost relationship and in the probability of intrusion). ROC curves are a good
performance representation if an IDS has greater hit rate and lower false alarm
rate than the one it is compared with. Else some alternative representation is
needed. In fact, even when ROC curves are useful they do not give quantitative
information about the dominance of one machine learning schema over another
(this difference depends on the costs and on the probability of intrusion). The
metric of value we propose gives a quantitative measure of how better a model
is under different operating conditions. Furthermore, value curves state if a clas-
sifier is worthless (no better than a predictive system based on uncertainty) and
allow to know how far a model is from a perfect one.
Results on the KDD dataset confirm that different classifiers stand out at
different operating conditions. So, over the intrusion detection domain, it is very
important to compare proposals considering the environment faced. In addi-
tion, the proper combination of different machine learning techniques produces
a more effective IDS in the sense that it can operate under different scenarios
(versatility) getting greater absolute values.
In conclusion, we encourage to adopt this evaluating methodology when eval-
uating and testing data mining approaches over the intrusion detection domain
in order to avoid out of context conclusions.
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